First to Take The War INto Cambodia

We would join 1,592 Special Forces (Green Berets) who, as
unconventional warriors, would fight alongside some 30,000 indigenous personnel
in what an excellent concept meant to rid South Vietnam of Communist Insurgents
and defend the nation against an invasion from North
Vietnam.

Eventually
the U.S. Government would withdraw all Special Forces, cut funding and, in
1973, abandon and betray the South Vietnamese people who had counted on us to
keep our promise to help them defeat Communism.
It wasn't a lack of courage on the part of the brave South Vietnamese
people or their fighting regulars, paramilitary forces or the Civilian
Irregulars who worked and fought with us at their side. It was, in fact, the cowardly withholding of U.S.
Presidential and Congressional backing, the departure of our fighting forces
and the subsequent denial of promised logistical and financial support of their
defensive effort that led to the North Vietnamese victory. When forced to fight
a numerically superior military machine supported by Communist China, the South
Vietnamese lost the war, lost their national identity and became virtual
prisoners of the Communist System.

It is a
fact that few, if any, of us Special Forces personnel who had volunteered to help
the South Vietnamese defend their nation knew in advance (as General William
Westmoreland admits in his biography A Soldier Reports) that our government had given the enemy safe-havens all along
the border of South Vietnam with Cambodia and permitted them the use of the
Mekong River to bring weapons and ammunition into Cambodia. Once there the
enemy would use them to kill and/or wound our men and our allies. Perhaps the
most heinous illegal orders perpetrated by our government denied our men along
the border the right to fire on the
enemy in self defense if attacked by rockets, mortars or artillery from inside
Cambodia and could not follow an enemy into Cambodia that had come across that
same border into South Vietnam and killed or wounded our fighters and then
retreated back into those sanctuaries.

Our initial
briefings at Nha Trang by the 5^th Special Forces Group commander and
his staff included no mention of the safe havens or the Mekong
River use by the enemy. It wasn't
until I reported to LTC William Tuttle, commander of all Special Forces in the
4^th Tactical Zone (the Delta area) in Can Tho, and had volunteered
to command a just approved TOP SECRET Independent CIDG (Civilian Irregular
Defense Group) Operation that I learned of the enemy's safe havens inside Cambodia.
In fact, though General Westmoreland lacked the integrity and the courage to
resign rather than acquiesce to aiding the enemy, there was a South Vietnamese
Special Forces Major who did have the guts.

Major Phoi
Van Le commanded the Hoa Hao CIDG forces in AnPhu District with its 30 kilometer
common border with Cambodia,
and was the military advisor to the Hoa Hao Central Council. On his own volition he met with the South
Vietnamese Minister of Defense in Saigon, explained the
situation in AnPhu and demanded the right, if attacked from inside Cambodia,
to enter Cambodian territory in Hot Pursuit of enemy forces and to exchange
indirect mortar or rocket fire with the enemy as a defensive measure.

The only contingency
stipulated by the CIA was that an American Special Forces officer would command
the newly approved TOP SECRET Independent Operation. I was lucky to be there at the right time to
volunteer and I knew that once I was on the ground in AnPhu, as LTC Tuttle
explained, I would decide when to take the war to the enemy forces inside Cambodia,
previously considered their sanctuary.

Shortly
after Major Le and I were heading the operation as a team we regained all
territory that had been occupied by the enemy and pushed the Viet Cong Regiment
deep inside Cambodia
and at least three kilometers away from the border. It may well have been the only 30 kilometers
of border with Cambodia
where the enemy was denied a close-proximity to the border safe haven. The real
shame, in my judgment, was the fact that other Special Forces teams along that
30 kilometer stretch were forced by our government (even General William
Westmoreland as ordered by the White House) to permit that same enemy a
sanctuary to attack from and return to with our forces ordered to leave them
be! The evil nature of that Presidential
dictum favored the enemy and resulted in countless deaths in friendly military
and civilians alike.

I am
understandably proud to have served with Major Phoi Van Le, then a veteran of
18 years of fighting many enemies to protect the 64,000 people of An Phu. With exception of 200 Malaysian-Polynesian
Chams all were Buddhist Hoa Haos. The Hoa Hao Sect wanted nothing more than a
quiet, upright and productive life along the Bassac
River fishing or tending their
agricultural pursuits. His courage, integrity and leadership qualities made it
possible for our outnumbered and outgunned forces to secure the border and lob
the first high explosive mortar rounds into the close by VC safe-havens, beginning
at five minutes past midnight on the 1^st
day of January 1966. Within a few weeks
we had penetrated the border area on foot in hot pursuit of the enemy and I had
the honor of being the first American to set foot inside Cambodia
in a combat action, a fact corroborated by Major Le and his people.

I suggest
that you read my book and see for yourself photos of those of us who were
working together to keep An Phu free of Communists. The Buddhist Hoa Haos were
no doubt the finest people I have had the pleasure of working with, fighting
alongside and living a life of victory with.